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Executive Overview
By integrating organizational and institutional theories, this paper develops a contingency approach to
executive remuneration and assesses its effectiveness in different organizational and institutional contexts.
Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principal-agent framework and assumes a
universal link between executive incentives and performance outcomes. We suggest a framework that
examines executive compensation in terms of its organizational contexts and potential complementarities/
substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels.
We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive compensation policy such as “soft
law” and “hard law.”
Over the past two decades, companies aroundthe world have increasingly moved from afixed pay structure to remuneration schemes
that are related to performance and include a
substantial component of equity-based incentives.
As a result, research on the economic effects of
executive compensation has become one of the
hotly debated topics within corporate governance
research. As Bruce, Buck, and Main (2005, p.
1493) indicated, “In recent years, literature on
executive remuneration has grown at a pace ri-
valed only by the growth of executive pay itself.”
Most of the empirical literature on executive
compensation has focused predominantly on the
U.S./U.K. corporate sectors when analyzing orga-
nizational outcomes of different components of
executive pay, such as cash pay (salary and bonus),
long-term incentives (e.g., executive stock op-
tions), and perquisites (e.g., pension contributions
and company cars). In terms of its theoretical
underpinnings, previous research has attempted
to understand executive compensation in terms
of agency theory and explored links between
different forms of executive incentives and firm
performance.
This literature is motivated by the assumption
that, by managing the principal-agency problem
between shareholders and managers, firms will
operate more efficiently and perform better. Much
of corporate governance research is based on a
universal model outlined by principal-agent the-
ory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986), and the
central premise of this framework is that share-
holders and managers have different access to
firm-specific information, and broadly divergent
interests and risk preferences. As a result, manag-
ers as agents of shareholders (principals) can en-
gage in self-serving behavior that may be detri-
mental to shareholders’ wealth maximization. A
substantial body of literature is based on this
straightforward premise and suggests that, to con-
strain managerial opportunism, shareholders may
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use a diverse range of corporate governance mech-
anisms, including various equity-based managerial
incentives that align the interests of agents and
principals. As Jensen and Murphy (1990, pp. 242–
243) observed, “Agency theory predicts that com-
pensation policy will tie the agent’s expected util-
ity to the principal’s objective. The objective of
shareholders is to maximize wealth; therefore
agency theory predicts that CEO compensation
policies will depend on changes in shareholder
wealth.” The key metric in effecting positive or-
ganizational outcomes is pay-performance sensi-
tivity (Bruce et al., 2005).
However, this “closed system” approach, found
predominantly within Anglo-American agency-
based literature, posits a universal set of linkages
between executive incentives and performance
and devotes little attention to the distinct con-
texts in which firms are embedded. Despite con-
siderable research effort, the empirical findings on
these causal linkages have been mixed and incon-
clusive. For example, empirical studies and meta-
analyses of the effects of executive equity-related
incentives on financial performance have failed to
identify consistently significant effects (see, for
example, the surveys and commentaries of Core,
Guay, & Larcker, 2003; Daily, Dalton, & Rajago-
palan, 2003; Hall, 2003; and Tosi, Werner, Katz,
& Gomez-Mejia, 2000). In a more recent critique
of agency theory, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel,
and Jackson (2008) pointed out its “undercontex-
tualized” nature and hence its inability to accu-
rately compare and explain the diversity of corpo-
rate governance arrangements across different
organizational and institutional contexts. Simi-
larly, much of the resulting policy prescriptions
enshrined in codes of “good” corporate gover-
nance rely on universal notions of best practice,
which often need to be adapted to the local con-
texts of firms or translated across diverse national
institutional settings (Aguilera & Cuervo-Ca-
zurra, 2004; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Fiss &
Zajac, 2004).
In this paper we discuss an organizational ap-
proach to executive compensation that will better
account for the interdependencies of incentive
alignment with diverse organizational contexts
and institutional environments. Building on re-
search by Aguilera et al. (2008) we suggest that
corporate governance aspects of executive com-
pensation outlined by the agency and stakeholder
perspectives must capture the patterned variation
in corporate governance caused by differences in
organizational contexts and their environment.
Along these lines, we build on recent studies of
corporate governance that have attempted to ex-
plain the dynamic dimensions of corporate gover-
nance over the company life cycle (Filatotchev &
Wright, 2005), as well as the diversity of corporate
governance arrangements across countries (Agu-
ilera & Jackson, 2003; Bruce at al., 2005). Thus,
an important task in corporate governance re-
search is to uncover the diversity of arrangements
and to understand how the effectiveness of exec-
utive remuneration is mediated by its alignment
with situational variables (“context”) arising in
diverse organizational contexts and institutional
environments (Aguilera et al., 2008).
We suggest a novel contingency-based frame-
work for understanding the governance roles of
executive compensation, which we conceptualize
in terms of organizational context, complementa-
rity/substitution between governance factors, and
the impact of institutional environments. Organi-
zational context refers to variations in firms’ inter-
nal and external strategic resources and specific
stages in their organizational life cycle (OLC). For
example, older firms in the mature phases of their
business life cycle may have a more diversified
resource pool and “professionalized” management
team. As a result, they may be in greater need of
formal incentive alignment mechanisms com-
pared to younger, founder-owned firms in their
start-up phase, which may have narrower resource
bases and thus higher focus on reputational, capa-
bility-related aspects of governance. Organiza-
tional context may affect not only potential ben-
efits of executive compensation schemes, but also
their costs, such as the direct costs of equity-based
incentives and their indirect effects on managerial
behavior and risk taking. These costs will vary for
different firms operating in different sorts of envi-
ronments, so that cost-benefit analyses are rarely
universal. Complementarity/substitution refers to
the overall “bundles” of corporate governance
practices that are aligned with one another and
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mutually enhance the ability of those practices to
achieve effective corporate governance. Here we
argue that the effectiveness of executive compen-
sation may depend on the presence of other gov-
ernance factors, such as high shareholder involve-
ment and board independence. Finally, institutions
put a strong emphasis on social embeddedness and
path dependence of executive compensation as a
governance factor. Executive pay packages must
be socially legitimate in relation to prevailing
regulatory, normative, and cognitive impacts on
organizations. As a result, these societal effects
must be reconciled with organizational efficiency
(Bruce et al., 2005).
Principal-AgentDichotomyVersus
OrganizationalApproach to Executive
Remuneration
Principal-agent theory dominates research onmanagerial incentives, and it is primarily con-cerned with efficiency outcomes of executive
compensation schemes from the perspective of
shareholders, who invest resources and seek max-
imum return on their investment. This approach
relies on the assumption of “arm’s-length” con-
tracting between shareholders and managers, and
self-interested opportunism as a basis of their con-
tracts (Bruce et al., 2005). Thus, besides attracting
and retaining a high-quality management team,
well-designed incentive schemes should increase
corporate productivity and value by better align-
ing top managers’ interests with those of share-
holders (Hall, 2003).
Some studies, however, claim that executives,
and particularly CEOs, enjoy positions of power in
relation to the design of pay packages and are able
to insulate themselves from constraints applied by
regulators and shareholders. Self-interested exec-
utives may now extract rents by manipulating
board structures in their own favor (i.e., by nom-
inating their cronies as board members), subject
mainly to an “outrage” constraint applied by the
media (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). The CEO’s pay
arrangements, therefore, have less to do with in-
centive alignment and more to do with the CEO’s
self-enrichment or “skimming” (Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan, 2001). The extent to which sharehold-
ers’ agency problems are resolved and skimming
prevented is typically assessed by associating ex-
ecutive pay with the performance of the firm
(Buck & Shahrim, 2005).
Empirical corporate governance research has
begun to cast doubt on whether there is a direct
and universal link between executive compensa-
tion and firm efficiency. Many have begun to
question whether this association holds across the
multiple variants of agency conflicts (Van den
Berghe, Levrau, Carchon, & Van der Elst, 2002);
different organizational contexts such as entrepre-
neurial ventures, initial public offerings (IPOs),
and mature firms (Filatotchev & Wright, 2005);
and different national settings. Perhaps more im-
portant is the fact that the performance impact of
executive remuneration appears to differ with re-
spect to the national institutional contexts. For
example, studies of executive pay show strong
correlations between pay and performance in the
United States (Hall, 2003) and relatively lower
effects of equity-based incentives in the United
Kingdom and Germany (Bruce et al., 2005),
whereas executive pay in Japan has no incentive
effects (Kubo, 2005).
Meanwhile, studies in organization theory and
strategic management suggest a number of alter-
native views on the governance roles of executive
compensation. For example, stewardship theory
has relaxed some of the assumptions about man-
agerial behavior found in agency theory, arguing
that managers may act as stewards for the good of
the organization in situations where only rela-
tively minor conflicts of interests exist (Davis,
2005). Likewise, stakeholder theory recognizes
that the effectiveness of corporate governance fac-
tors depends on a wider set of firm-related actors
and their interactions (Freeman, 1984), although
this research has paid relatively less attention to
executive incentives.
Despite their differences, a common tendency
within these research streams is their reliance on
universalistic models of efficiency, which abstract
away from important organizational and environ-
mental complexities (Aguilera et al., 2008). In
agency theory, the “undercontextualized” ap-
proach remains restricted to mostly two actors
(shareholders and managers), with little attention
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to how agency problems may vary across diverse
task and resource environments, the life cycle of
organizations, or different institutional environ-
ments. Although Williamson (1991, p. 277) sug-
gested that transaction costs may be different in
different institutional and organizational contexts,
he pointed out that mainstream corporate gover-
nance research is “too preoccupied with issues of
allocative efficiency . . . to the neglect of organi-
zational efficiency in which discrete structural al-
ternatives were brought under scrutiny.” Steward-
ship and stakeholder theory remove some
restrictive assumptions of the agency approach,
yet do not provide a comprehensive research
framework that links executive incentives with
the broader context of different organizational
environments.
Following Aguilera et al. (2008) we propose
that executive compensation research should
adopt a more “open-system” approach, which
treats organizational features as being interdepen-
dent with the diversity, fluctuations, and uncer-
tainties of their environment, and rejects univer-
salistic “context-free” propositions. In short, an
open-system approach emphasizes the importance
of examining executive compensation practices
within a holistic context rather than as single
factors acting in isolation.
Table 1 provides a summary of the main points
of departure between the “traditional” agency-
based approaches to executive compensation and
our conceptual framework, which is grounded in
organizational theory and synthesizes various em-
pirical findings through a relatively parsimonious
set of constructs. This approach is aimed at better
understanding the interdependence between ex-
ecutive remuneration practices and the organiza-
tional and institutional environment in which
these practices are conducted. These specific con-
structs are organizational context, complementa-
rity/substitution with a corporate governance
“bundle,” and institutional effects. In short, we
claim that the organizational effectiveness of ex-
ecutive incentives does not have a direct and
linear effect on performance as suggested by main-
stream agency research. This effect is contingent
on a number of firm-level and macro factors that
are, as a rule, not accounted for in the vast ma-
jority of studies. In the following sections we
attempt to discuss these important contingency
factors and their potential effects on the effective-
ness and efficiency of executive compensation
schemes.
Organizational Context
Organization theorists have examined how theeffect of organizational (“structural”) charac-teristics on effectiveness or performance may
be mediated or influenced by contextual variables,
such as task uncertainty, task interdependence,
and organizational dynamics (Donaldson, 2001;
Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright, 2006). Although
Table1
NormativePrincipal-AgentPerspectivevs. Contingency Frameworkof ExecutiveCompensation
Principal-Agent Model Contingency Framework
Organizational actors ●Managers
● Shareholders
●Managers
● Shareholders
● Stakeholders
Organizational context ● Focus on large, mature firms
● Focus on benefits of incentives, but also direct costs of
share options
● Recognition of differences between OLC stages
● Opportunity costs and reputational costs of
executive compensation
Complementarity/substitution ● Direct independent effect on performance
● Recognition of possible complementarities/substitution
with other governance factors
● Incentives as component of governance
“bundles”
● “Equifinality” of governance effects
National institutions ● Context-free approach
● Focus on the U.S./U.K. environment
● “Contextualization” of agency conflicts
● Focus on moderating effects of national
institutions
Policy recommendations ● Rules
● “Minimum standards”
● Principles
● “Best practices”
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executive compensation might be considered as a
structural governance characteristic within this
framework, organization theory has not elaborated
with regard to the effectiveness of this form of
corporate governance. Here we build on previous
research and examine how the effectiveness of
incentive mechanisms may be mediated by an
important category of organizational contingen-
cies, namely the resources and capabilities that
shape firms’ interdependences with different orga-
nizational environments (see Aguilera et al.,
2008, for a more detailed discussion).
One aspect of resource-related contingencies is
grounded in the resource-based view of the firm,
which takes into account its resources and capa-
bilities, such as skills, knowledge, and ability to
innovate (Barney, 1991). A further aspect of re-
source-related contingencies comes from resource
dependency theory, which suggests that firms will
respond to demands made by external actors or
organizations upon whose resources they are
heavily dependent, but also that organizations
may seek to buffer against or minimize that exter-
nal dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For
example, the degree and nature of external fi-
nance is likely to influence the demands placed on
corporate governance to ensure accountability
and incentive alignment. Organizational context
considerations thus imply that the role and effects
of incentive schemes are likely to differ in ways
contingent upon both the external and internal
resources that are critical within the context of
the firms’ organizational, market, sectoral, or reg-
ulatory contexts. In other words, the effectiveness
of executive incentives may depend on the firm’s
size or age, the phases of growth or decline in the
company’s development, and the character of in-
novation in different markets and sectors, among
many other factors (Aguilera et al., 2008). While
an organizational perspective rejects the notion of
universal best practices (Donaldson, 2001), it also
suggests that policy will be more effective if it
takes into account the potential diversity of orga-
nizational contexts. In short, a one-size-fits-all
approach is undesirable.
There is an increasing recognition in manage-
ment research that the organizational resource
base and its interdependence with external envi-
ronments are not static, but an integral part of
organizational dynamics. The application of a
contingency-based concept of corporate gover-
nance has been developed within an emerging
body of research on the life cycle of corporate
governance (Filatotchev et al., 2006; Filatotchev
& Wright 2005). This literature identifies a num-
ber of stages in the development of the firm and
links them with changes in the extent and nature
of agency conflicts that require governance rem-
edies, including incentive alignment. Corporate
governance is viewed here as a dynamic system
whereby governance practices may address chang-
ing sets of environmental interdependencies
throughout the different stages of the OLC, such
as start-up, growth, maturity, and decline. Figure 1
illustrates this theoretical framework.
Over the OLC stages, firms may evolve from
having a very narrow resource base to having a
more extensive and heterogeneous resource base.
This transition may require at least temporary
reliance on external resources. Providers of these
external resources create new corporate gover-
nance demands to assure that wealth is not only
created but also distributed fairly in terms of each
factor provider, whether these are shareholders or
other stakeholders. This is reflected in changes in
accountability of the firm’s management to exter-
nal resource providers (Filatotchev et al., 2006).
In the early stages of the OLC (Quadrant 1 of
Figure 1), the entrepreneurial firm has a narrow
resource base. It is usually owned and controlled
by a tightly knit group of founder-managers and/or
family investors, with the level of managerial ac-
countability to external shareholders generally
low. In this context, a substantial portion of the
founder-managers’ wealth is linked to the firm,
which questions the appropriateness or may even
undermine the effectiveness of equity-based in-
centive schemes, in line with arguments devel-
oped by Core and Guay (2010).
As the firm grows, it requires access to external
resources and expertise that may fuel and support
this growth, and it opens up its governance system
to external investors, such as business angels and
venture capital firms. At this stage, the balance
between resources and accountability starts to
shift toward greater transparency and increasing
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monitoring by external providers of resources. An
IPO (Quadrant 2 of Figure 1) represents a dra-
matic shift from an entrepreneurial firm to a “pro-
fessional” firm with a fully developed governance
system. The shift in accountability widens the
firm’s access to the financial resources of the stock
market. In their analysis of executive compensa-
tion in IPO firms Allcock and Filatotchev (2009)
identified an increasing role of executive share
options as an emerging governance mechanism
aimed at aligning interests of managers and in-
coming public market investors. However, they
also identified a number of limitations imposed on
this mechanism by the specific organizational
context of IPO firms related to the continuing
dominant role of the firm’s founders in its gover-
nance system.
In the next stage, internal and external re-
sources are invested in the firm’s growth as it
matures and exploits strategic opportunities
(Quadrant 3 of Figure 1). When the firm has
exhausted its growth opportunities in the focal
industry and perhaps overdiversified into related
and unrelated industries, the governance system
becomes less transparent. Misalignment of incen-
tives leads to a managerial drive for ever-increas-
ing expansion and diversification, producing per-
formance deterioration and loss in shareholder
value. At this stage executives, and particularly
CEOs, arguably enjoy positions of power in rela-
tion to the design of pay packages, and the CEO’s
pay arrangements may have less to do with incen-
tive alignment and more to do with the CEO’s
self-enrichment or skimming (Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan, 2001). In a turnaround situation, exec-
utive remuneration schemes themselves may turn
into a driver of further decline through their ef-
fects on managerial risk taking and time horizons
(Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996).
The only viable strategic alternative at this
stage may be to take a public company private
(Quadrant 4 of Figure 1). Restructuring of a de-
clining organization following a public-to-private
buyout may result in a reinvigoration of the life
cycle as more transparent incentive and gover-
nance mechanisms are introduced in the form of
increased managerial equity, monitoring by pri-
vate equity firms, and a commitment to service
debt. As such, the organization may narrow the
scope of its activities and start a new cycle.
In sum, an effective incentive mechanism de-
pends on patterned variations over the OLC,
rather than conforming to a universalistic model.
Organizational context underlines the “open” na-
ture of organizational interdependence, such that,
whereas mature firms may be concerned with re-
ducing agency costs through incentive alignment,
new entrepreneurial firms face different chal-
lenges in terms of making sure that founder-man-
agers are able to anticipate future technological
developments and growth opportunities as they
Figure1
Organizational andCorporateGovernanceDynamics
Source: Filatotchev, I., Toms, S., & Wright, M. (2003). The firm’s strategic dynamics and corporate governance life-cycle. International Journal of
Managerial Finance, 2(4), 256–279.
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try to buffer environmental uncertainties (Fila-
totchev & Bishop, 2002).
The potential benefit of various governance
practices is at the core of corporate governance
research. However, Aguilera et al. (2008) argued
that organizational context may also affect poten-
tial costs related to the inputs of corporate gover-
nance. These often appear as “externalities” or
unintended consequences that stem from or are
manifest in the broader environment of the orga-
nization and reduce the effectiveness of corporate
governance. Such costs will vary across firms to
the extent that they operate in different sorts of
environments.
Executive compensation schemes may have as-
sociated costs of several types, starting with the
direct costs that are reflected in the firm’s balance
sheet and other accounting documentation (Hall,
2003). In addition, incentive systems may impose
less explicit opportunity costs (e.g., changes in
managerial risk preferences) and reputational
costs (e.g., costs of fraud, misconduct, or executive
irresponsibility). These various costs may have
different effects on the multiple parameters of
incentive schemes’ effectiveness, implying poten-
tial trade-offs between them.
Previous research is mainly focused on direct
costs of various types of executive compensation,
such as the out-of-pocket expenses associated with
executive stock options (Oyer & Schaefer, 2006;
Ronen, 2008). The cost of executive stock options
to shareholders can be estimated using the familiar
Black-Scholes formula, though this may not be
applicable to executive options that cannot be
traded continuously thanks to vesting and holding
periods (Hall & Murphy, 2002). Notably, these
costs differ according to different sectoral and
national regulatory environments. An important
implication is the differential impact of costs on
firms depending on their resource capacities. For
example, large firms with sufficient resources can
more easily buffer these direct costs, while smaller
firms with greater resource constraints may be
unable to comply and may consequently face rel-
atively high costs of executive bonding and incen-
tive alignment (Aguilera et al., 2008).
Beyond these direct costs, executive compen-
sation also entails less explicit and more indirect
opportunity costs, which are often difficult to
quantify (Hall, 2003). These costs relate to how
an incentive mechanism affects managers’ risk
perceptions and strategic priorities and conse-
quently the exploitation of business opportunities,
and they may differ depending on the organiza-
tional context. For example, Hall and Murphy
(2000) argued that, because executives in mature
companies are forced by vesting requirements and
insider share restrictions to hold more company
equity than is desirable from a portfolio diversifi-
cation perspective, they discount the value of
their equity holdings. This “value-cost wedge” is
the price that companies have to pay in order to
generate the benefits of equity-based pay.
At the other end of the OLC spectrum, All-
cock and Filatotchev (2009) examined the effects
of opportunity costs associated with executive
stock options in IPO firms. These authors inte-
grated behavioral agency research (e.g., Wiseman
& Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman & Gomes-Mejia,
1998) with “prospect theory” research (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979) and suggested that execu-
tives’ risk preferences and decisions may be driven
by “problem framing,” with their retained equity
stakes after an IPO being an important factor
affecting this framing. The lock-up restrictions on
equity trading after the IPO may create transac-
tion costs that prevent executives from adjusting
their equity holdings to an optimal level. There-
fore, using locked-up executive equity as a refer-
ence point for framing problems as gain or loss,
the authors’ behavioral model predicts that exec-
utives should exhibit risk-averse preferences when
considering the appropriateness of different types
of incentive schemes at an IPO.
Finally, executive compensation schemes may
influence costs related to the reputation of the
firm. For example, Hall (2003) and Buck &
Shahrim (2005) discussed problems of executive
gaming or skimming associated with stock op-
tions. Equity-based pay, combined with the in-
tense pressure to meet investors’ expectations, can
create unwanted consequences such as accounting
manipulation or falsification of information aimed
at boosting the stock price. As Hall (2003, p. 25)
put it, “High-powered equity-based pay—particu-
larly when combined with very short or no vesting
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restrictions—can encourage actions that are un-
ethical and wasteful at best, and massively value-
destroying and fraudulent at worst.” Some compa-
nies may be more vulnerable to reputation costs,
such as auditing firms or banks, than firms that are
traditionally less reliant on reputational capital,
such as manufacturing firms. The important point
is that the degree of direct, opportunity, or repu-
tational costs associated with a particular compen-
sation practice will affect different aspects of ef-
fectiveness, and their salience will vary across
different organizational environments.
ComplementaritiesandSubstitution
BetweenCorporateGovernance Factors
One of the central weaknesses in most execu-tive compensation studies is the assumptionthat incentives and other types of corporate
governance influencing performance are concep-
tualized and operationalized as independent and
that each governance factor will have its own
unique ability to influence the firm’s strategies and
performance. This supposition presumes that gov-
ernance factors are both linear and additive to the
extent that the effect of an internal or external
governance attribute is the same regardless of the
levels and combinations of other organizational
attributes, or even the institutional conditions
surrounding the company. However, the inconsis-
tency of evidence across the spectrum of research
on executive incentives suggests that the perfor-
mance implications of a range of governance fac-
tors are a significantly more complex phenome-
non than previously understood.
A growing literature has considered corporate
governance as a system of interdependent ele-
ments by exploring how governance practices in-
teract and potentially complement each other as
related “bundles.” Aguilera et al. (2008) devel-
oped this research further by focusing on comple-
mentarities between governance practices on a
firm level, or interactions between practices and
how these interactions align governance to poten-
tially diverse organizational environments. An
important implication of this research is that ef-
fectiveness does not result from a universal “one
best way,” but suggests that particular practices
will be effective only in certain combinations.
Furthermore, different sets of corporate gover-
nance practices may be further linked with costs
and contingencies, as discussed in the previous
sections, to understand how different patterns of
corporate governance may give comparative ad-
vantages for different business strategies or indus-
try environments.
A number of studies have made a first attempt
to examine complementarity and substitution ef-
fects in terms of the combinations of corporate
governance factors at the organization level. This
research suggests that the simultaneous operation
of multiple factors is important in limiting mana-
gerial opportunism (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh
& Seward, 1990). For example, performance in-
centives for executives are more effective when
complemented with an effective market for cor-
porate control. These interdependent practices
would remain quite ineffective without further
complementary practices, such as high informa-
tion disclosure to investors to allow the market to
price shares accurately and a rigorous system of
auditing to ensure the quality of that information.
This view is consistent with recent “set theo-
retic” approaches to studying organizational prac-
tices (Fiss, 2008) that focus on equifinality,
whereby different initial conditions lead to similar
effects or multiple conjunctural causation (Kogut,
MacDuffie, & Ragin, 2004; Ragin, 2000). In
short, this framework helps explain why no one
best way exists to achieve effective corporate gov-
ernance. Rather, corporate governance arrange-
ments are diverse and exhibit patterned variation
across firms and their environments.
Among all potential combinations of corporate
governance practices, the complementarity/substi-
tution framework suggests that some combina-
tions will be more effective than others. Indeed,
recent literature has found more complex or sur-
prising combinations of corporate governance
variables, including executive compensation, than
implied by early works that focused on a single
effect of a particular incentive mechanism. For
example, Hoskisson, Castleton, and Withers
(2009) posited that there may be a dynamic in-
terdependence between board monitoring and the
extent of executive compensation. Contrary to
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conventional views, they argued that the increas-
ing level of executive compensation may be ex-
plained not by failures in monitoring but rather by
monitoring becoming increasingly intense due to
the greater numbers of independent directors on
the board and growing shareholder activism. In-
creased monitoring intensity shifts risk to manag-
ers, who then require greater compensation to
offset their increased employment and career risk.
The authors concluded that monitoring intensity
is positively related to bonding so that over time
they are complements.
While mapping such combinations is beyond
the scope of this paper, the important analytical
point here is that the effectiveness of executive
compensation practices cannot be seen in isola-
tion from other governance practices. In fact,
these combinations may have opposite effects in
different organizational contexts. In their analysis
of executive share options in IPO firms, Allcock
and Filatotchev (2009) showed that, contrary to
the agency theory predictions, board indepen-
dence does not have any effects on “toughness” of
executive compensation in terms of conditions
that have to be met. However, the retained own-
ership of venture capital firms is positively associ-
ated with the probability of performance-based
incentive schemes. Again, this research indicates
that executive compensation should be consid-
ered in relation to other governance characteris-
tics of the firm.
ExecutiveCompensationandNational
Institutions
As we indicated in the introduction, most of theempirical literature on executive compensa-tion, specifically when analyzing organiza-
tional outcomes of different components of exec-
utive pay, has been focused predominantly on the
U.S./U.K. corporate sectors. Meanwhile, many el-
ements common in the Anglo-American model of
corporate governance remain absent in other
countries. Table 2 provides a breakdown of CEO
compensation packages in the largest companies
around the world, and it shows substantial differ-
ences among various countries. For example, in
the United States, incentive plans account for the
lion’s share (60%) of total compensation, whereas
base salary and cash bonuses account for just 23%
and 17% of the total, respectively. In Japan, how-
ever, 71% of the total executive compensation is
related to base salary, with executive equity plans
accounting only for 17%. European countries are
somewhere in between the two, with executive
remuneration more evenly distributed among the
three components.
There are marked differences among countries
in terms of the total value of executive compen-
sation. For example, Thomas (2008) reported re-
sults of a CEO pay survey around the world by
Tower Perrin and showed that total CEO pay in
Germany, Sweden, and China amounted to 51%,
44%, and 21% of CEO pay at comparable U.S.
firms. Clearly, the structure and levels of execu-
tive compensation are very different around the
world, and this may reflect significant institu-
tional differences among countries.
A growing body of research argues that the
efficiency and effectiveness of corporate gover-
nance factors, including executive compensation,
should be considered within the context of na-
tional institutions (Bruce et al., 2005; Buck &
Shahrim, 2005). More generally, Schmidt and
Table2
Structureof CEORemunerationPackagesAround
theWorld
Country
Base Salary
(%)
Cash Bonus
(%)
Incentive Plan
Compensation
(%)
United States 23 17 60
Brazil 27 41 32
Germany 39 47 14
United Kingdom 40 38 22
France 44 25 31
Ireland 44 43 13
Hong Kong 51 19 30
Netherlands 51 28 21
Belgium 52 26 22
Italy 52 29 19
Japan 71 12 17
Note: Companies with revenues between $1 billion and $3
billion.
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide. (2009). Executive pay prac-
tices around the world. London: Watson Wyatt.
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Spindler (2004) analyzed potential complementa-
rities between various elements of national gover-
nance systems and suggested that various gover-
nance elements may complement each other in a
consistent way to form path-dependent national
systems within broader institutional and cultural
contexts. Recent comparative work stresses the
potential for organizational diversity within na-
tional economic systems, so that institutions may
support certain types of organizations at the ex-
pense of others (Aoki, 2001; Aoki, Jackson, &
Miyajima, 2007; Williamson, 1991). National
governance models have emerged as a key concept
in comparative work on the diversity of national
systems of corporate governance (Aguilera &
Jackson, 2003). A more recent organizational per-
spective on corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera
et al., 2008) suggests that firm-level governance
characteristics may be institutionally embedded.
Therefore, the appropriateness and effectiveness
of the specific incentive scheme may depend on
the institutional context in which the firm oper-
ates and the extent of its conformity to the legit-
imized norms and expectations in that market.
Institutional theory provides an alternative ex-
planation for firm behavior than that proffered by
neoclassical economics, arguing that firm behav-
ior can be understood in terms of shared beliefs of
organizational actors, independent of their inter-
ests (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Rather than
make predictions based on utilitarian (e.g., eco-
nomic) bases, institutional theory identifies social
mechanisms that explain organizational behav-
iors. Consequently, strategic decisions that make
rational, economic sense can fail to be understood
from a more socialized perspective by examining
those decisions vis-a`-vis key stakeholders. Peng,
Sun, Pinkham, and Chen (2009) used recent de-
bates around executive compensation in the U.S.
to illustrate this point. The competitive market
for executive talent and the traditional tolerance
for larger income inequality in the U.S. have
fueled executive compensation. However, after
2008, during which many companies were bailed
out or received substantial state support, the gen-
eral sentiment with regard to executive compen-
sation changed. Bounded rationality of the exec-
utives resulted in a failure to recognize changes in
the informal (but powerful) norms concerning
what was fair, thus attracting criticism from the
media and the new president. So in addition to
instrumental, economic considerations, the for-
mulation of incentive strategy involves the need
to provide justifications for decisions and behav-
iors that are considered legitimate by organiza-
tional stakeholders.
Understanding the differences in the institu-
tional environments may help to develop a more
comprehensive analysis of the effects of executive
compensation in different countries in general,
and explain striking differences in the pay-perfor-
mance sensitivity around the world in particular
(Buck & Shahrim, 2005). North (1990) specified
that formal institutions consist of laws and regu-
lations, political and economic rules and proce-
dures, and other explicit constraints on behavior.
Alternatively, informal institutions consist of
those unwritten, yet quite influential, societal
norms, conventions, and values.
In the United States, stock-based executive
compensation is so prevalent (Coombes &
Watson, 2001) that it has achieved “taken for
granted status” (Sanders & Boivie, 2004, p. 171)
among financial and business community mem-
bers. From an agency perspective, it would appear
that U.S. investors place greater reliance on this
monetary measure as the preferred incentive
alignment mechanism. Its explicit nature, favor-
able tax treatment under the U.S. accounting
rules, its assumption that managers are individuals
solely motivated by self-interest and extrinsic re-
wards, make stock options a very appealing incen-
tive system in the eyes of U.S. shareholders.
Outside the U.S. institutional context, execu-
tive share options often contradict prevailing cul-
ture, contingencies, and coalitions of interest
(Bruce et al., 2005; Buck & Shahrim, 2005).
When investors rely on reputational consider-
ations rather than formal equity-based incentives
in evaluating the probability of self-serving behav-
ior of managers, presence of executive share op-
tions would have relatively lower weight in terms
of the firm’s expected cost of capital.
In the United Kingdom, there is a considerable
public debate with regard to incentive properties
of executive share options. Since the late 1980s
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and early 1990s, many observers have found the
dramatic increase in executive pay to be unjusti-
fiable (Smith & Szymanski, 1995). The general
consensus has been that U.K. regulations have
done little to address the issue of executive pay in
detail. Instead, the main focus has been on disclo-
sure and transparency. Studies comparing execu-
tive compensation in the United States and
United Kingdom have found that the sensitivity
of executive compensation to increases in share-
holder wealth are much greater in the United
States than in the United Kingdom, with the
difference largely attributable to greater share op-
tion awards in the U.S. (Conyon & Murphy,
2000).
Unlike in the United States and United King-
dom, in German and Japanese corporate gover-
nance systems, monitoring has been based on re-
lationship-oriented banks rather than an active
market for corporate control (Aoki, 2001). The
long-term nature of bank-firm relationships may
also complement a more active role for other
stakeholders, such as employees, as employees’
investments in firm-specific capital are protected
from breaches of trust (Aoki, 2001). As a result,
the applicability of equity-based incentives in
these countries is generally restricted compared to
the U.S., as clearly indicated in Table 2.
In our preceding discussion we emphasized the
importance of considering complementarity and
substitution among different governance practices
on the firm level. Institutional analysis extends
this framework further by suggesting that national
institutions in general, and national governance
models in particular, may shape the effectiveness
of executive compensation. In economies charac-
terized by diffuse share ownership, less significant
roles of stakeholders, and higher tolerance to in-
come inequality, one may expect executive incen-
tives to play an important governance role by
aligning interests of managers and shareholders
(Hall, 2003). However, in societies with strong
egalitarian tendencies, powerful stakeholders and
reputational concerns that frame managerial be-
havior, the effectiveness of executive compensa-
tion may be limited regardless the specific organi-
zational context.
Implications for FutureResearch
Grounding analysis of executive compensationin organizational theory has important impli-cations for future research. Our approach to
executive compensation suggests that the effi-
ciency of different incentive schemes should be
considered within the organization’s context, such
as stages in the OLC, level of business complexity,
and strategic environment. For example, future
studies may differentiate between the governance
roles of incentives in diverse forms of organiza-
tions, such as entrepreneurial firms or multina-
tional companies, which have often been over-
looked in the governance literature. In addition,
similarities and differences in incentive schemes
can also be more systematically compared within
and across industries, and recent controversy
around bonus payments in financial institutions
clearly indicates that industry context should be
taken into account. Another area of research is
related to potential organizational costs of execu-
tive incentives. Only a few studies have consid-
ered indirect opportunity costs associated with
behavioral aspects and/or reputational concerns.
Again, this research was predominantly focused
on large, mature firms, and there is a dearth of
studies in other contexts, such as entrepreneurial
firms and IPOs (Allcock & Filatotchev, 2009).
In addition, the vast majority of previous stud-
ies are focused on the economic effects of exec-
utive incentive schemes without taking into
account potential interdependencies between var-
ious governance mechanisms. Hoskisson et al.
(2009) provided a first attempt to discuss potential
substitution/complementarity between executive
compensation and board independence. Future re-
search should look at other components of the
firm’s governance bundle, such as ownership
structure and the identities of block holders,
shareholder activism, and the firm’s exposure to
the market for corporate control. Recent advances
within the set theoretic framework may be a useful
research methodology able to operationalize and
test more complex and context-dependent theo-
ries (Fiss, 2008; Ragin, 2000).
Finally, our discussion suggests that national
institutional environments may affect the nature
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and extent of agency conflicts at the firm level,
and the effectiveness of executive incentive
schemes may depend on the specific institutional
factors, such as laws and regulation, cultural as-
pects, and common beliefs of economic actors.
Future research has to identify which institutional
factors are more salient in terms of their effects on
executive compensation within a comparative
framework. For example, future studies may ex-
plore and compare the governance role of execu-
tive compensation in different national models of
governance, including models based on family
control (prevalent in emerging economies such as
India) or the government (which plays an impor-
tant role in Chinese and Russian companies).
Regulatory Implications
The argument above for a more contextualizedapproach to executive compensation has im-plications for public policy. In the light of
corporate governance scandals and perceived ad-
vantages in reforming governance systems, de-
bates have emerged over the appropriateness of
different policy approaches based on “hard law,”
or regulation that draws on “soft law” such as
codes based on comply-or-explain principles
(Thomas, 2009).
The hard law approach to regulation seeks to
strengthen corporate governance through legal
rules that cover all companies operating in a par-
ticular jurisdiction. Such an approach mandates
high minimum standards, with failure to meet the
standards resulting in severe legal penalties (Agu-
ilera et al., 2008). In terms of executive compen-
sation, advocates of a hard law approach suggest a
set of rules, such as caps on the amount of exec-
utive pay, a mandated remuneration structure
with increased amount of deferred shares, or even
restrictions on the distribution of stock to execu-
tives, such as regulation of the firm’s ability to
issue new stock and/or stock buybacks (Thomas,
2009). In addition, disclosure regulations in many
countries require corporations to introduce “say-
on-pay” policies and reveal details concerning
their executive compensation arrangements. The
U.S. system has the most demanding set of rules in
this regard.
Soft law is based on an alternative approach of
comply-or-explain principles. It provides guide-
lines and best-practice principles for the determi-
nation of executive pay, which have been devel-
oped in various corporate governance codes
promulgated recently. In the United Kingdom,
listed companies can rely on detailed guidance on
the design of performance-related compensation
provided by the Combined Code on Corporate
Governance.1 This approach has been criticized
for its weaker degree of enforcement and inability
to mandate uniform minimum standards, but it
has potential benefits in dealing with different
organizational contingencies. Namely, the flexi-
bility for firms to adapt or mix various corporate
governance practices under soft law may help
them to tailor corporate governance to diverse
organizational environments.
It is beyond this paper’s scope to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of advantages and
problems associated with the two approaches. Our
analysis makes it clear, however, that each ap-
proach may be associated with regulatory trade-
offs, especially with regard to executive compen-
sation. For example, it was hoped that a universal
requirement to disclose the structure and level of
executive compensation in the United States
would slow the increase in executive pay, with the
publicity about high pay working against abuses.
However, Hall (2003, p. 32) argued that, “once
executives began to see more clearly how much
their peers were making, they wanted more—and
boards granted more.” Thus, while disclosure was
generally aimed at curbing excesses, it also had
unintended consequences by creating a fertile
ground for abuses. In line with our analysis above,
this example also suggests that executive compen-
sation regulation should take into account other
governance factors, such as the extent of board
vigilance (Hall, 2003) and shareholder involve-
1 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance sets out standards of
good practice in relation to issues such as board composition and develop-
ment, remuneration, accountability and audit, and relations with share-
holders. All companies incorporated in the U.K. and listed on the Main
Market of the London Stock Exchange are required under the Listing Rules
to report on how they have applied the Combined Code in their annual
report and accounts. Overseas companies listed on the Main Market are
required to disclose the significant ways in which their corporate gover-
nance practices differ from those set out in the Code.
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ment in setting the structure and levels of pay
(Thomas, 2009).
This discussion suggests that the regulatory
trade-offs associated with different approaches to
regulation of executive pay can be better under-
stood by analyzing the implementation of policy
in terms of organizational contexts, governance
complementarities, and institutions. For example,
U.K. regulators currently feel that codes need to
be strengthened by greater legislative underpin-
nings to ensure enforcement. However, the fact
that the U.K. approach is arguably the less uni-
versalistic and more contextualized may also help
to explain why other countries on the whole have
tended more to follow the U.K. Combined Code
approach, defined above (Aguilera & Cuervo-Ca-
zurra, 2004). What is less clear is whether these
countries have institutional characteristics similar
to those of the United Kingdom combined with
robust firm-level governance systems, which make
sure that soft law has a significant impact on
executive pay.
Conclusion
Building on the “open systems” approach tounderstanding organizations and their envi-ronments, this paper suggests a more contex-
tualized framework that may be usefully applied to
the analysis of executive compensation. Far from
being comprehensive, it nevertheless draws atten-
tion to environmental interdependencies of cor-
porate governance in terms of organizational con-
text, complementarities, and substitution related
to various well-known practices of corporate gov-
ernance and the role of national institutions. In
order to take systematic account of these factors in
future empirical research, studies of executive
compensation must explore the patterned varia-
tion of corporate governance practices, their com-
binations, and their effectiveness in terms of
alignment of organizations with a more contextu-
alized view of organizational environments.
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